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Abstract
An income inequality measure satisﬁes the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle if progressive transfers
decrease income inequality. When transfers cause transaction costs, one can trace out the
maximum leakage such that the transfer pays at the margin. An income inequality measure is
leaky-bucket consistent if the transaction costs of a transfer are neither negative nor do they
exceed the amount of the transfer. We show that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and leaky-
bucket consistency are not reconcilable.
Experimental research has shown that subjects’ behavior exhibit graded compensating justice,
that is compensating income changes which maintain the degree of income inequality and point
in the same direction should provide less income compensation for richer than for poorer income
recipients. We also show that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and graded compensating
justice are not reconcilable.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D 31, D 63
∗ Department of Applied Economics IV, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain
∗∗ Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Germany1 Introduction: Transfers with Transaction Costs or
Income Changes which Preserve Income Inequality
Okun (1975, pp. 91-95) investigated the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle when transfers
incur transaction costs. He observed that “the money must be carried from the rich to the
poor in a leaky bucket. Some of it will simply disappear in transit, so the poor will not
receive all the money that is taken from the rich.” (Okun 1975, p. 91.) Okun raised the
question to the observer of how much leakage he or she would accept and still support the
Tax-and-Transfer Equalization Act. Stating his own attitude, he would stop at a leakage
of 60 percent (Okun 1975, p. 94), but recognizes that some people might wish to take
money away from the super-rich even if not one cent reached the poor.
To pin down Okun’s problem, we have to answer the question as to the maximum
amount of transaction costs such that a transfer would be considered as justiﬁed at the
margin in the eyes of the beholder. This can be expressed in terms of the beholder’s social
welfare function (that is, welfare should be maintained after the respective move), or in
terms of the beholder’s inequality perception (that is, the degree of income inequality is
maintained after the respective move)1. As social welfare functions and income inequality
measures are but two sides of the same coin (Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), Dagum
1Although Okun is not explicit about the measure to be applied to determine the maximum leakage,
we will not go astray in assuming that he had the observer’s judgment on the social welfare of the
society in mind. In this view, he followed Pigou (1950, p. 89) who remarked: “... it is evident that
any transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament,
since it enables more intense wants to be satisﬁed at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the
aggregate sum of satisfaction. ... Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the hands
of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the size of the national dividend from any
point of view, will, in general, increase economic welfare.” [Cf. also Pigou (1912, p. 24).] Although Pigou
(1950, pp. 90-91) surmised that the rich are, from the nature of their upbringing and training, capable of
obtaining considerably more satisfaction from a given income than the poor, he recognized (pp. 91-92)
that these diﬀerences will fade away in the long run: “in the long run diﬀerences of temperament and
taste between rich and poor are overcome by the very fact of a shifting of income between them.” Dalton,
like Pigou, considered the economic welfare derived from income as the decisive economic category, but
Dalton (1920, p. 351) took the alternative route, as he associated the transfer principle in the ﬁrst place
with diminishing income inequality. Incidentally, note that Dalton (1920, pp. 349-350) anticipated both
Atkinson’s and Theil’s income inequality measures.
1(1990, 1993)), we shall focus on the beholder’s income inequality perception.
Income transfers are just a special case of income inequality perceptions. They illustrate
but one way of how changes in income distributions can come about. More generally, we
will consider income changes of some speciﬁed income recipients and ask for the necessary
change of the incomes of some speciﬁed other income recipients such that the former
degree of income inequality is recovered.2 We call this view compensating justice.
Well-known examples of compensating justice are scale and translation invariant in-
come inequality measures, respectively. Suppose that the incomes of some, but not all,
income recipients are decreased or increased by the same percentage. This changes the
indicator of income inequality. Its original value is restored for a scale invariant inequality
measure if the incomes of the rest are also changed by the same percentage. Translation
invariance repeats this story for equal absolute changes of incomes. If they apply to
some, but not to all, income recipients, then the original value of a translation invariant
inequality measure is restored if the incomes of the rest are also changed by the same
amount.
Experimental research by Camacho-Cuena et al. (2006) has shown that compensating
justice in a speciﬁc form governs subjects’ behavior also for cases in which only two
incomes change. If the income of a poor income recipient increases (decreases), then the
income of a richer income recipient should also increase (decrease), however less (more), in
order to restore the original degree of perceived income inequality. This pattern is more
pronounced the greater the income diﬀerence between the involved income recipients
is. We call this behavioral pattern graded compensating justice. For our theoretical
considerations it can easily be generalized in terms of an axiom for any ﬁnite set of
income recipients.
Note that graded compensating justice lies outside the corridor of intermediate income
inequality measures (see, e.g., Kolm (1976), Bossert and Pﬁngsten (1990), Seidl and
Pﬁngsten (1997), del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (2000)) as marked by scale invariance on the
one side and translation invariance on the other. Graded compensating justice can be
considered as an attitude of infra-translation invariance, or, to put it in Kolmian (1976,
pp. 417-425) terms, it deﬁnes an ultra-leftist income inequality measure. This might
2This stance corresponds to the view of Lambert and Lanza (2006).
2sound strange to some readers, but recall that it is overwhelmingly supported by real
subjects’ behavior.
Section 2 provides some preliminaries of income inequality relationships, Section 3
presents impossibility theorems of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle on the one hand,
and compensating justice and leaky-bucket consistency, respectively, on the other, and
Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory of Income Inequality Relationships
We allow only for strictly positive and ﬁnite incomes, which are diﬀerent for diﬀerent in-
come recipients. The number of income recipients is assumed to be ﬁnite. The anonymity
axiom holds. The income inequality measures are assumed to be continuously diﬀeren-
tiable.
Thus, we consider only income distributions y = {yi | i = 1,...,n; 1 < n < ∞ } such
that, by the anonymity axiom, we can focus on an increasing arrangement of incomes,
0 < y1 < y2 < ... < yn < ∞. µ denotes mean income. The set of such income
distributions is denoted by Y . Income inequality measures are denoted by I : Rn
++ → R+.
Definition 1 (Invariance): A relative inequality measure satisﬁes scale invariance,
that is I(y) = I(λy) for all λ > 0. An absolute inequality satisﬁes translation invariance,
that is I(y) = I(y + αe) for all α ∈ R such that y1 + α > 0, where e denotes the unit
vector.
Definition 2 (Transfer Principle): I(·) satisﬁes the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle
if
I(y + τej − τek) < I(y) and I(y − τej + τek) > I(y) for all yj < yk,
where ei denotes an n−dimensional vector with a 1 on the i−th position and zeros every-
where else, and τ is such that 0 < τ < mini,`∈{1,...,n} | yi − y` |.
Definition 3 (Inequality Aversion): A diﬀerentiable income inequality measure I(·)






for yj < yk.
3Note that the observance of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle or of inequality aversion
rules out constant income inequality measures.






















































Theorem 6: For diﬀerentiable inequality averse relative and absolute income inequality
measures there exists a benchmark y∗, y1 < y∗ < yn such that
∂I
∂yi




> 0 for all yi > y∗.







increases monotonically as yi increases. Hence, there exists a
benchmark, y∗, such that
∂I
∂yi
< 0 for all yi < y∗ and
∂I
∂yi
> 0 for all yi > y∗. Q.E.D.
4It seems that the existence and properties of benchmarks were ﬁrst noticed and ana-
lyzed by Seidl (2001) and Hoﬀmann (2001). The most comprehensive study is by Lambert
and Lanza (2006).
Definition 7 (Graded Compensating Justice): Let (δ
+
1 ,...,δ+
n ) denote a decreas-
ing series whose members are all positive, let (δ
−
1 ,...,δ−
n ) denote a decreasing series whose
members are all negative, and let (ε1,...,εn) denote a vector whose components are either
0 or 1, where at least two εi’s assume the value 1. Then compensating justice holds if for
any feasible vector (ε1,...,εn) there exists some (δ
+
1 ,...,δ+




that I(y1,...,yn) = I(y1 + ε1δ
+
1 ,...,yn + εnδ+
n ) = I(y1 + ε1δ
−
1 ,...,yn + εnδ−
n ).
Note that this deﬁnition allows that the δi’s may depend on the vector (ε1,...,εn).
However, this is immaterial for our proofs, as the general pattern, viz. that the δi’s form
a decreasing series, remains intact. In other words, the decreasing series need not be
unique.
The next deﬁnition returns to Okun’s problem and considers a simple progressive
transfer from a richer to a poorer income recipient. It states leaky-bucket consistency,
that is simply that transaction costs should neither exceed the transfer nor should the
transaction costs become negative (which would be tantamount to a transfer subsidy).
Definition 8 (Leaky-Bucket Consistency): An income inequality measure I(·) is
leaky-bucket consistent if the transaction costs t of a transfer τ, which together maintain
the same degree of income inequality, satisfy the condition 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
3 Impossibility Theorems
This section shows three impossibility theorems. First, we show that graded compensat-
ing justice and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle are not reconcilable for diﬀerentiable
income inequality measures. This can be shown irrespective of conventional invariance
conditions such as scale and translation invariance. In other words, one must abandon
either graded compensating justice or the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. This is all
the more remarkable, since experimental research has not yielded convincing support for
5the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle,3 whereas graded compensating justice enjoys much
greater behavioral support (Camacho et al. (2006)).
Second, we show that graded compensating justice and the Pigou-Dalton transfer prin-
ciple are not reconcilable for relative and absolute income inequality measures. This is
not unexpected for two reasons: recall that scale invariance and translation invariance
are two diﬀerent varieties of compensating justice. As graded compensating justice, as
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7, represents another form of compensating justice, impossibility is
around the corner. Graded compensating justice lies, on the other hand, outside the corri-
dor of intermediate income inequality measures between the borders marked by scale and
translation invariance. Being an ultra-leftist income inequality measure, it is, therefore,
at variance both with scale and translation invariance (as well as with other intermediate
income inequality measures). However, this has to be formally proved.
Lastly, the most intriguing of these three impossibility theorems seems to be the third
one. In this impossibility theorem, we draw on leaky-bucket consistency rather than on
graded compensating justice and show that it is not reconcilable with the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle. This is nothing else but a devastating blow against Okun’s conjecture.
For many transfer situations there do not exist transaction costs which are neither negative
nor do they exceed the amount of the transfer itself. In other words, for many transfer
situations there do not exist feasible transaction costs such that the transfer “pays at
the margin”. This result is also fatal for leaky-bucket experiments which overlook this
circumstance.
Notice that our impossibility theorems are stated in terms of the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle, whereas in our proofs we rely on inequality aversion. This is immediate given
Theorem 14 in the Appendix, which shows equivalence between inequality aversion and
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Note, moreover, that Theorem 14 in the Appendix
also allows us to extend our impossibility theorems to S-convexity and Lorenz consistency.
Theorem 9 (Impossibility of a Just Pigouvian): There is no diﬀerentiable income
inequality measure which satisﬁes graded compensating justice and the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle.
3See, for instance, Amiel and Cowell (1992, 1998, 2000), Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993), Harrison
and Seidl (1994 a,b).
6Proof: By inequality aversion there are either
n
2




positive or non-negative. In the ﬁrst case select a subset of the respective εi’s, say K,
]K ≥ 2, and set them equal to one and the other εi’s equal to zero.
Then we have for {δ
+
i | i ∈ K}:
I(y1 + δ
+
1 ε1,...,yi + δ
+
i εi,...,yn + δ
+








for inequality aversion. Yet by Theorem 14 in the Appendix inequality aversion is equiv-
alent to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
For {δ
−
i | i ∈ K} we have:
I(y1 + δ
−
1 ε1,...,yi + δ
−
i εi,...,yn + δ
−








for inequality aversion, which is equivalent to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.




Theorem 10 (Impossibility of a Scale or Translation Invariant Just Pigou-
vian): There is no relative or absolute inequality measure which satisﬁes graded compen-
sating justice and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
Proof: Let εi = 1 for all i = 1,2,..n. Consider










where the δi’s can stand either for δ
+
i or for δ
−
i .
Scale invariance implies I(y) = I(λy); translation invariance implies I(y) = I(y+αe).
Note that, by construction, (λy), (y + αe), and (y1 + δ1,y2 + δ2,...,yn + δn) all have
the same mean. Yet (y1 + δ1,y2 + δ2,...,yn + δn) can be attained from (λy) or (y + αe)
by a series of progressive transfers. This means
I(y1 + δ1,y2 + δ2,...,yn + δn) < I(λy) = I(y), or
I(y1 + δ1,y2 + δ2,...,yn + δn) < I(y + αe) = I(y),
which establishes a contradiction to graded compensating justice. Q.E.D.
7Note that scale invariance—and, more generally, unit consistency as deﬁned by Zheng
(2007, p. 102)—is of an ambiguous character. On the one hand, it makes an income
inequality measure immune to inﬂation and to the unit of measurement. It would indeed
be absurd if the degree of income inequality in Spain or in Germany had changed as a
consequence of the transition from Pesetas and Deutschmarks, respectively, to Euros. On
the other hand, if all real incomes had changed in the same proportion, this might well
matter for the degree of income inequality in a given country.4 Considerations like this
have given rise to the development of intermediate income inequality measures, graded
compensating justice being analogous to them.
Theorem 11 (Impossibility of a Leaky-Bucket-Consistent Pigouvian): There
is no diﬀerentiable relative or absolute income inequality measure which satisﬁes the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and leaky-bucket consistency.
Proof: By Theorem 6 there is at least one income recipient above and one below the
benchmark. Consider ﬁrst yj < y∗ < yk. Maintenance of the degree of income inequality
requires












τ < 0 and
∂I
∂yj
(τ − t) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
Consider, second, that both income recipients are above the benchmark. Then equation







(τ − t) < 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
From Theorem 14 of the Appendix we know that inequality aversion is equivalent to the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
4Dalton (1920, p. 356) argued that both equal proportional and equal absolute additions to all incomes
diminish inequality. He restricted that to real income increases and required that the units of money
income in any two cases to be compared must have approximately equal purchasing power (Dalton (1920,
p. 356, footnote 2). Following Mill, Pigou (1950, p. 90) argued that it is the relative position of an income
recipient in the income gamut which determines his or her satisfaction, rather than the actual level of
income.
8For the ﬁrst case in the proof of Theorem 11, the degree of income inequality could
only be restored for transaction costs which exceed the amount of the transfer, that is,
the poor should also suﬀer an income loss resulting from the “transfer” in order to restore
the former degree of income inequality.
For the second case in the proof of Theorem 11, the degree of income inequality could
only be restored for negative transaction costs, that is, for transfer subsidies. The (poorer)
transfer recipient would have to get more than the amount of the transfer in order to
restore the former degree of income inequality.
Theorem 11 is, in particular, fatal for leaky-bucket experiments which conﬁne subjects’
responses to transaction costs satisfying the constraint 0 ≤ t ≤ τ. An experimental design
constrained as such abandons either scale or translation invariance or the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle.
4 Conclusion
This paper starts with Okun’s investigation of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in the
presence of transaction costs which cause a leakage in transferring income. Okun raised
the question as to the maximum amount of transaction costs such that a transfer is
considered as justiﬁed at the margin.
More generally, consider income changes of some speciﬁed income recipients. The
problem of changing the incomes of some other speciﬁed income recipients which restore
the original degree of income inequality is called compensating justice. Experimental
research suggests that people support a particular variety of compensating justice, viz.
graded compensating justice. It demands that all compensating income changes point in
the same direction; the triggering income changes (all having the same sign) imply that the
compensating income changes of richer (poorer) income recipients are less than the income
changes of poorer (richer) income recipients. This means that graded compensating justice
is an ultra-leftist inequality attitude.
Section 2 sets the formal frame of our analysis. It deﬁnes invariance, the transfer
principle, inequality aversion, graded compensating justice, and leaky-bucket consistency
(i.e. that the transaction costs should be non-negative and should not exceed the transfer).
9Moreover, we establish the existence of a benchmark separating negative and positive
partial derivatives of an income inequality measure.
In Section 3 we present three impossibility theorems. First, we show that graded com-
pensating justice and the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers are not reconcilable. Second,
we show that this impossibility result extends to relative and absolute income inequality
measures at large. Third, we show that leaky-bucket consistency is not reconcilable with
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle for relative and absolute income inequality measures.
Appendix
Definition 12 (Lorenz Consistency): I(·) is Lorenz-consistent if Lorenz-domination
of y over y0 implies I(y) < I(y0).
Definition 13 (S-convexity): I(·) is strictly S-convex if I(yP) < I(y) for all bis-
tochastic matrices P except permutation matrices.
Theorem 14 (Equivalence Theorem): The following statements are equivalent:
(i) I(·) is inequality averse.
(ii) I(·) satisﬁes the transfer principle.
(iii) I(·) is strictly S-convex.
(iv) I(·) is Lorenz-consistent.





















τ := ∆I for all yk < yj .
But this implies the transfer principle.
(ii) ⇒ (iii). Deﬁne κ :=
1
τ
(yj − yk), where yk < yj. Because of
0 < τ < min
i,`∈{1,...,n}
| yi − y` |
10we have κ > 1. Then (y +τek −τej) can equivalently be achieved by multiplying y
by the n–dimensional bistochastic matrix











where E denotes the unit matrix, E
jj
kk denotes a matrix whose elements ψi` are
ψi` = 1 for i = ` = j and for i = ` = k, and 0 otherwise, and E
jk
kj denotes a matrix
whose elements ϕi` are ϕi` = 1 for i = j, ` = k and for i = k, ` = j, and 0 otherwise.
By the transfer principle we have
I(y) > I(y + τek − τej) = I(yA),
which implies strict S-convexity of I(·), as there exists a bistochastic matrix for any
sequence of progressive transfers.
(iii) ⇒ (iv). Strict S-convexity of I(·) implies
I(y) > I(yP) = I(yPΠ)
for all bistochastic matrices P and all permutation matrices Π. Let (z1,...,zn)
















i=1 zi and y 6= z (as P is not a permutation matrix), there
exists a unique k, such that yi ≤ zi for all i ≤ k, and yk < zk, yk+1 > zk+1. Hence,
z Lorenz-dominates y.
(iv) ⇒ (i). For 0 < τ < mini,`∈{1,...,n} | yi − y` | the income distribution (y + τek − τej),
k < j, Lorenz-dominates the income distribution y. For a Lorenz-consistent income












, which is inequality aversion.
Q.E.D.
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